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The first 100 days of the Conservative government 
brought wide-ranging cuts to renewable energy 
supports, energy efficiency programmes, and 
relevant tax structures, prompting concern 
that the new government had embarked on 
a politicised attack on ‘green energy’.  The 
government defended its decisions as a 
necessary and overdue corrective to a system 
that had become overly expensive and complex 
– a “hard reset” precursor to a rationalisation of 
the UK energy policy landscape.  UCL launched a 
series of blog post contributions from its experts 
on the theme. This report brings together these 
contributions and offers tentative conclusions 
about the policy direction and key outstanding 
issues in UK energy policy. 
With her major ‘reset’ speech of 18 November, 
Secretary of State Amber Rudd has reaffirmed 
the government’s commitment to the 
‘trilemma’ goals of security, affordability and 
decarbonisation. The latter includes the legally 
binding framework of UK carbon budgets 
and the mid-century 80% reduction under the 
Climate Change Act, underlined by commitment 
to phase out coal within a decade. The Paris 
climate conference is expected also to embed 
the EU reduction goals for 2030.
To solve the ‘trilemma’, effective and efficient 
energy policy requires three main pillars: 
efficient consumption with informed consumer 
choices; effective markets with full cost 
pricing; and strategic investment in innovation 
and infrastructure. Particularly when set in a 
strong framework of directional clarity, these 
together these can form the essential package 
to transform energy systems over time to meet. 
Concerning the policy decisions to date: 
Pillar 1: Efficient consumption 
Overall, energy efficiency policy over the past 
15 years has been a remarkable success: it 
has improved living standards for millions and 
cut energy bills and overall energy demand 
substantially. The biggest of these programmes, 
CERT, contributed substantially to declining 
national energy demand; we estimate the value 
of its energy savings at more than £2bn annually 
- far exceeding the costs of the programme 
even after allowing for gaps between modelled 
and monitored impact. 
Enhanced energy efficiency has also helped to 
‘keep the lights on’, and forestalls the need for 
new investment: without the impact of energy 
efficiency policies on demand, the cost of the 
Capacity Mechanism could have been several 
billion pounds annually, rather than less than 
one billion realised in the last auction. Declining 
energy demand has also significantly reduced 
the amount of renewables investment required 
to meet the UK renewables target, since that 
is specified as a percentage of national energy 
consumption.
However the ‘Green Deal’ approach to energy 
efficiency introduced by the coalition had largely 
failed; there was a case to scrap its approach 
of relying on consumer-led energy efficiency 
through loans. Its failure, predicted by many 
experts, reflected a niaive approach to the 
nature, scale and complexity of the challenge 
– the ‘web of constraints’ that impede efficient 
energy consumption. 
The plausible concern – albeit far from adequately 
documented – that the zero carbon homes target 
would drive up the cost of new houses suffered 
from exaggeration of costs and neglect of many 
of the benefits.  Its removal has not only disrupted 
an industry that had spent 10 years preparing 
for the challenge, but leaves occupants of these 
new homes more exposed to higher energy bills 
– and the likely costs of later refurbishment. With 
its rhetoric about removing ‘regulatory burdens’, 
it is also unclear whether the government has 
recognised the benefits that British business 
has gained from the government-led energy 
efficiency programmes. 
A new mantra of focusing energy efficiency on 
the most vulnerable households suggests that 
government is not yet recognising the wider 
strategic role of energy efficiency in meeting the 
UK’s energy policy goals. This may indeed reflect, 
if not politicisation, a somewhat ideological 
approach based on simplistic assumptions 
about what the market can (and cannot) deliver. 
In short, the first 100 days have left a big gap in 
energy efficiency, which has yet to be filled by 
new, evidence-based policy. The main remaining 
programme, ECO, is due to expire in 2017; much 
may hinge on whether and how it is extended, 
developed to fill the gaps created, or replaced. 
If this final supplier-led policy is terminated – 
perhaps on the grounds that many dwellings 
have now been insulated - the main remaining 
option for buildings would seem to be minimum 
performance standards or equivalent incentives 
applied at times of major refurbishment or sale.
Pillar 2: Markets, pricing and subsidies 
Competitive forces are vital to efficient policy, 
but markets can come in different forms and 
only deliver well if prices reflect full costs and 
benefits. In coalition, the government had 
introduced the carbon floor price, but then 
froze the level due to concerns about the gap 
with European CO2 prices. It also delivered the 
Energy Market Reform, which established a new 
structure of long-term Contracts for Difference 
(CFDs) for renewables (and nuclear and CCS) 
combined with a Capacity Mechanism to ensure 
Security of Supply. Competitive auctions under 
both mechanisms held in the final months of 
coalition delivered substantially lower costs 
than expected. However, by then the huge surge 
in renewable energy had fuelled opposition to 
onshore wind, and led to total support costs 
exceeding the Levy Control Framework agreed 
with the Treasury. This set the stage for the 
dramatic cutbacks noted – the ‘hard reset’ on 
renewable energy. 
Individually the measures taken were 
understandable, in the light of cost overruns. But 
the addition of the Treasury requiring renewables 
to pay the climate change levy (even though the 
contracts awarded only six months earlier had 
no indication of or allowance for this) amplified 
the appearance of a war on renewables – fuelled 
further by continuation of huge subsidy for the 
Hinkley Point C nuclear station underwritten by 
additional Treasury loan guarantees.  
It seemed that in coalition the Conservatives had 
help to construct a powerful vehicle in the EMR, 
but had now switched the engine off except for 
nuclear and increasing taxes on renewables, 
whilst protesting a philosophy that governments 
should not be involved in choosing particular 
technologies.  The sense of a generalised attack 
on the environmental agenda was enhanced 
further by removal of Vehicle Excise Duty 
incentives for low carbon vehicles.
Six months in to the new government, these 
changes may best be viewed as a mix of 
politicisation, rationalisation, and over-reaction: 
• The cutback on onshore wind was 
politicised, but legitimately so since it was 
written in to the Conservative manifesto 
and reflects the narrow desires (and 
wider misconceptions about costs and 
variability) in the Tory heartland. The fact 
that it increases the cost of energy for all 
is increasingly recognised as a headache, 
though government crack-down on 
planning for wind whilst easing it for shale 
gas would appear to betray a more deep-
rooted inconsistency. 
• The rush of renewable energy – breaching 
overall budgets despite major unit cost 
reductions - did point to an urgent need 
to rationalise supports which had proved 
overly generous.
However, the requirement for renewables to pay 
the CCL has appearance of an ill-considered 
grab by the Treasury with scant regard to either 
the environment purpose, or to the damage 
done to investor confidence – a sense of 
‘payback time’ for breaching the agreed limits. 
Continuing with Hinckley Point, a technology far 
from the ‘market’ and with the least prospect 
for cost reduction, can only be understand as a 
decision driven largely by inertia, a niaive view 
around the need for ‘baseload’ power, and/or 
considerations outside the energy sector (such 
as perceived needs of the Chinese economic 
relationship). 
Along with its wider reaffirmation on the ‘energy 
trilemma’, Amber Rudd’s “reset” speech 
underlined the vital importance of increasing the 
carbon price, reiterated support for the EMR and 
indicated that up to three auctions for renewable 
energy will be held during the Parliament, 
executive summary
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subject to cost reductions. Marking the end of 
a turbulent period of transition, this potentially 
offers a good basis from which to move forward. 
Options to rationalise policy and restore investor 
confidence will need to include: 
• A consistent approach to decentralised 
energy, including whether cuts to small-
scale PV (now not far from competitive 
with retail electricity prices) will provide 
a glide path for an industry which hardly 
even existed in the UK a mere 5 years 
ago - or be set at a level which risks 
choking off the industry entirely.
• A credible approach to onshore wind 
– its claim to be seeking ‘cost-effective’ 
renewables appears hollow unless it 
structures a market that at least allow 
the cheapest renewable energy a fair 
chance for investment without subsidy. 
This report suggests a structure which 
retains long-term contracts, backed by 
compensation for the carbon savings 
valued according to the government’s 
own estimate of this value.  
• A systems approach to renewables 
overall, where the volume has risen so 
fast that its impact on overall system 
operation will soon become significant 
(though still lower than several EU 
countries). The value of renewables 
may depend increasingly on when 
(and where) they generate. This report 
suggests ways in which these costs 
(and benefits) can start to be reflected 
within the structure of CfD contracts 
introduced in the Energy Market 
Reform, suitably modified.
There are, in short, rational ways to move forward 
after the reset, taking account of the concerns 
raised and moving to restore confidence in the 
wider direction of travel. 
One thorny issue will be the UK’s 2020 renewables 
target. The explosive growth of renewables in 
electricity means that that component can now 
readily be met, but the renewables target is 
an aggregate across all sectors. The transport 
component would require stronger policy action, 
and heat is very problematic. The purpose of 
making the target legally binding under EU law 
was to enhance investor confidence; it remains 
unclear whether that can or will be delivered, and 
the extent to which electricity could or should 
pick up the slack left by the harder sectors. 
The heat component in particular is highly 
problematic, though this is not helped by the 
discrepancy that whilst the cumulative charges 
on electricity equate to something close 
to the government’s social cost of carbon, 
those on gas do not remotely do so.  An era 
of falling wholesale energy prices would be 
the obvious opportunity to correct this long-
standing anomaly, and to demonstrate that the 
government is not simply becoming beholden 
to the gas industry, and intends to live up to 
its rhetoric on using economically efficient and 
market-based approaches.
Pillar III: Strategic investment 
The UK under-invests in energy sector research 
and development, and the private sector cannot 
on its own fill the gap.  Private investment in 
energy R&D tends to be weak compared to 
other sectors, and is mostly directed along 
established, business-as-usual trajectories. 
Strategic investment and direction is critical 
to enable the innovation that is required for 
decarbonising the economy, and to do so in a 
way that delivers the best economic outcomes 
for the UK.
The UK could boost R&D and demonstration 
across a number of technologies including new 
solar and storage technologies, carbon capture 
and storage, and ‘generation IV’ nuclear. 
However there are no magic bullets: physics 
determines the energy resources we can draw 
on, including the fact that solar dominates our 
summer resources but wind does so in winter; 
extracting and disposing of CO2 from waste 
streams is inherently costly because of the 
sheer volume; and the world has already spent 
decades in the nuclear business. 
R&D thus needs to be matched by strategic 
investment for innovation and infrastructure to 
extend cost reductions in the industries already 
growing.  Most obviously, the UK has a major role 
in the offshore wind industry and – in contrast to 
the 1990s when the UK retreated from the global 
onshore wind business – has a strong stake in 
the supply chain and the economic benefits 
thereof. 
As the biggest resource for renewable energy 
in winter, when we most need energy, offshore 
wind can be not only a major component of the 
UK energy system, but a platform from which UK 
efforts can contribute to global reductions. To 
achieve that, costs need to come down further. 
The engineering is challenging and investment, 
with mix of public and private investment, is 
needed across the innovation chain. The scale 
– and the potential benefits – seem analogous 
to the development of the offshore oil and gas 
industries during the 1970s, which brought 
down costs dramatically after a decade of 
sustained investment exceeding £5bn/yr (in 
present money).
An important dilemma is the difficulty of using 
competitive pressures particularly for the bigger, 
more challenging commitments, like moving 
from shallow to deep offshore, or reaching the 
major resource of Dogger Bank, and connecting 
to the value and balancing capacities of 
countries around the North Sea. This scale 
(and timescales) starts to look more like those 
associated with nuclear power.  
After the next phase of CfDs, therefore, one 
intriguing option could be considered. To move 
away from ‘picking winners’ through government 
negotiations, and away from ‘subsidies’ by the 
mid 2020s, a longer term option could be to pit 
deep offshore and nuclear together in bids for 
providing low carbon energy to 2030 – perhaps 
even to the extent of competitive auctions for 
long-term contracts of common structure (eg. 
25 years).  
The government needs to ensure sufficient 
investment in offshore wind to bring it to the same 
stage of maturity as nuclear, but if it is serious 
about rationalisation, technology neutrality and 
the value of competitive forces, it could seek a 
pathway to a world in which nuclear and deep 
offshore wind offer a large enough pool to 
compete. 
Conclusions 
Energy policy involves long timescales. Stability 
derived from political consensus is therefore one 
of the most valuable attributes for energy policy 
and associated investment. Partisan instability 
is costly.  After a post-election spasm that 
has mingled politicisation with rationalisation, 
Amber Rudd’s speech of 18th November offers 
a tentative platform for sufficient renewed 
consensus: a reaffirmation of the ‘trilemma’ goal 
of security, affordability and decarbonisation 
set in a rational framework of carbon budgets, 
guided by the structure of the Climate Change 
Act. A recognition that government has to be 
involved, but needs a clear strategy to make best 
use of competitive forces and cost reductions. 
Innumerable details still need to be worked 
out.  A renewed strategy to reap the strategic 
as well as social benefits of energy efficiency 
remains to be charted. The politics of aligning 
economic incentives and prices, including 
between electricity and gas, have yet to be 
tested – as has the mechanisms and politics  for 
restoring a credible carbon price, the backbone 
of a ‘market based’ policy for decarbonisation. 
A credible regime for onshore wind is needed. 
The emergent strategy recognises that gas has 
a crucial role in the low carbon transition; but 
concerns about security could portend a risk 
of over-subsiding gas and creating stranded 
assets, whilst the promise of both solar and 
offshore wind could yet be choked off by overly 
drastic cuts. 
An integrated transport policy may start to 
interface with electricity, and new thinking will 
be needed to get to grips with heat. Accelerating 
innovation is not a separate challenge of R&D 
spend but needs embedding within the overall 
strategy, including its international dimensions. 
But if these and other challenges are now tackled; 
history may well judge Amber Rudd’s “reset” 
speech as the points at which the UK managed 
to restabilise energy policy, and moved from 
the risks of politicisation to the opportunities of 
rationalisation.
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By Michael Grubb
The conservative government inherited a 
problem in energy policy. So did the coalition 
government before it. 
As so often, the coalition’s solution to the 
problems inherited from the 2000s have fed 
the concerns of its successor, and the new 
government has set about changes with zeal: 
the first hundred days saw the end of subsidies 
to onshore wind and changing planning laws, 
requiring renewables to pay the climate change 
levy, initiating drastic cuts to feed-in tariffs, 
scrapping the ‘Green Deal’ and zero carbon 
homes policies, removing ongoing Vehicle 
Excise Duty incentives for low carbon vehicles, 
and deferring this year’s auctions for new 
renewable energy capacity.
This report brings together a series of 
contributions by UCL to the national debate 
published as blogs on the UCL Future Energy 
site over Autumn 2015. The report summarises 
the nature of problems the government 
inherited. We pinpoint two major mistakes in 
the Coalition’s reforms – excessive emphasis on 
purely financial & market-oriented approaches 
to energy efficiency, and a failure to recognise 
or prepare for just how much renewable energy 
could respond to the incentives created. The 
latter in particular has set the scene for what 
is now being termed the ‘hard reset’ of energy 
policy. 
to enhance its economic efficiency.  However 
the government’s moves alarmed investors 
and created the impression that it is engaged 
in a war on renewable energy in particular, and 
potentially energy efficiency policy as well. If 
true, this in turn would create a fundamental 
inconsistency between the government’s on-
the-ground energy policy actions, and its high-
level commitment to tackle climate change, 
take a strong stance in the EU and at the Paris 
COP21 climate change summit, and to support 
the Climate Change Act and deliver on existing 
targets (notably the Fourth Carbon Budget 
legislated by Parliament under the Act, and 
reaffirmed last year).
Is the new government correcting past flaws 
whilst taking a strategic view on how best to 
increase the efficiency and effectiveness of UK 
energy policy? Or is it becoming captured by 
the politicisation of energy and environmental 
debates that has bedevilled US policymaking, 
in which environment and sustainability issues 
become a political football, undermined as part 
of struggles between conflicting ideologies and 
interests?
Because energy is such a long term sector, 
politicisation – which caricatures the choices 
as being between economy vs environment, 
present vs future, individual vs social, and 
private versus government – would carry a high 
cost. Such divisions would inject fundamental 
uncertainty into the investment landscape, 
raising perceived investment risk and costs for 
all; and could in turn be exploited and enhanced 
by the vested interests of present incumbents.
At present the jury is still out on the question 
of where conservative UK energy policy is really 
heading, and the dominant motivations behind it. 
Many of the ‘hard reset’ steps initially taken are 
understandable in context. What really matters is 
what comes next, and whether the government 
bases its future policy on robust evidence, of the 
sort that can transcend the efforts of others to 
politicise the agenda.
In that vein, this report brings together a series 
of contributions from leading UCL researchers 
summarising key lessons and reactions to the 
changes. From a standpoint of economic and 
environmental efficiency, energy policy can 
be usefully understood in terms of three main 
decision-domains, each of them is closely tied 
to an area of policy: 
• A domain dominated by multiple 
small-scale decisions, by consumers 
or small business units, which often 
pay little direct attention to patterns 
of energy use and may be replete 
with behavioural, contractual, or other 
‘failures’ – these underpin the potential 
for enhancing energy efficiency; 
• A domain characterised by calculated 
cost-benefit decisions of (usually 
larger) market actors based on existing 
technologies and infrastructures – this 
underpins the importance of energy 
markets and full-cost pricing if these 
markets are to deliver an economically 
efficient outcome;
• A domain characterised by the 
potential for innovation and structural 
change including infrastructure; this 
underpins the importance of strategic 
investment to lower the future costs, 
including the transformation towards 
low cost, low carbon energy systems. 
We structure the report accordingly around 
the corresponding three main pillars of energy 
policy – energy efficiency, the use of economic 
instruments and design of markets, and strategic 
investment in innovation and associated 
infrastructure, and conclude with a closer look 
specifically at UK Energy Market Reform and 
renewables.
We do not agree with all the changes announced 
in the first 100 days, but acknowledge the 
legitimate concerns which drove many of them. 
We offer the analysis as UCL’s contribution to a 
crucial national debate, and offer some key tests 
as to whether the government’s ‘hard reset’ in 
reality heralds a rationalisation, or a politicisation, 
of the UK energy policy landscape.
introduction
The political context was dominated by the 
trend of energy prices and bills in the previous 
Parliament, as summarised in Figures 1(a) and 
(b).  
Energy prices had in fact been rising for a 
decade, this fed through into rising energy bills 
during the last Parliament. Gross ‘policy costs’ 
added about £60 (about 5% of total household 
bills) – though as indicated particularly in our 
analysis of energy efficiency it seems misleading 
to count costs without benefits. Politically 
however policy costs became a major focus of 
attention in the political panic over energy bills, 
which helped to set the scene for the rapid-fire 
actions of the government’s first hundred days.
The official position of the new government is 
that it is engaged in a necessary and appropriate 
rationalisation of UK energy policy, in particular 
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By Ian Hamilton and Peter Mallaburn
Those with long memories look at the current 
uncertainty about energy efficiency policy with 
a strong sense of déja vu. To some extent these 
moments of uncertainty are natural, and perhaps 
inevitable. When energy prices or environmental 
concerns rise sharply, governments take action 
to enhance energy efficiency as amongst the 
best responses. 
It is, however, rarely as exciting as supply-side 
‘big kit’; if concerns recede, energy efficiency 
tends to be neglected, sometimes in favour of 
a generalised assumption that markets should 
instead deliver. What matters is to ensure 
that each cycle is at least grounded in the 
understandings from previous efforts. What is 
surprising – and troubling - to those in the field 
is seeing energy efficiency being portrayed in 
some of the early commentaries and decisions 
after the 2015 election as a burden, rather than 
a benefit. 
The traditional “neoclassical” assumption has 
been that if energy efficiency saves money, 
markets would deliver it, at least when given the 
right information (“if there truly are £20 notes lying 
around, why don’t we pick them up?”).  Amidst the 
oil shocks of the 1970s, energy efficiency policy 
was technology- and information-led: informing 
people and companies about the savings to be 
made. However it became increasingly apparent 
that such approaches only delivered a small 
fraction of the savings apparently available. 
Governments of all colours have struggled with 
this for 30 years, slowly learning about a complex 
web of constraints and the ways of overcoming 
them, and often realising many of the benefits 
UK energy efficiency policy: taking stock
available. We know that varied programmes 
have resulted in energy savings (eg Hamilton 
et al 2013; Wyatt 2013). UK data shows that as 
the scale of efficiency programmes increased, 
and after more than three decades of stable 
or rising energy consumption, total UK energy 
demand since 2004 has fallen (Figure 2(a)), due 
particularly to energy intensity improvements 
in both service and household sectors (Figure 
2(b)).  
Policy has traditionally developed quite 
separately for residential and business sectors, 
and here we consider each in turn. 
Residential energy efficiency
Over the past 25 years, the UK residential sector’s 
energy efficiency policy has primarily been 
directed through a combination of: programmes 
requiring energy suppliers to retrofit efficiency 
improvements; building regulations; appliance 
efficiency standards; and more recently a short-
lived market-based approach, the ‘Green Deal’. 
These programmes have had multiple aims: to 
reduce general consumer exposure to rising 
energy prices (sometimes with other benefits, 
e.g. warmer and/or quieter homes from double-
glazing); to reduce national energy dependence 
and environmental impacts; and to protect 
vulnerable customers.
Programme developments
Following the energy deregulation of the 
1990s, energy suppliers were obligated 
to run programmes to improve the energy 
performance of their more vulnerable customers 
(Mallaburn and Eyre, 2013). Initially, the Energy 
Efficiency Standards of Performance (EESOP) 
scheme required suppliers to improve the 
energy performance of their household and 
business customers. The scheme focused on 
assisting ‘disadvantaged’ customers, along with 
determining supplier capability for delivering 
energy savings and their related environmental 
benefits.
In comparison with what followed EESOP was 
tiny, delivering measures estimated to have 
saved 18.5 TWh (lifetime savings) across the 
UK residential sector. Its successor, the Energy 
Efficiency Commitment (EEC) (2002-2008), had 
a similar rationale in terms of achieving multiple 
benefits, delivering about ten times as much 
energy savings (192 TWh of lifetime savings). 
This is the equivalent of reducing the UK’s total 
annual energy demand by 1% for 15 years, or 
turning the UK’s biggest power station (Drax) off 
for 7 years.
These different policy threads (i.e. building and 
appliance regulations, supplier obligations and 
market-based mechanisms) ran separately but 
in parallel until the mid-2000’s when they began 
to interact – initiatives such as the ambitious 
zero carbon homes policy were shaped partly 
in the context of the growing push to tackle 
CO2 emissions, that culminated in the Climate 
Change Act of 2008. The implication of the 80% 
mid-century reduction target enshrined in the 
Act is that some sectors (including the residential 
sector) would need to almost completely 
decarbonise to account for those that could not. 
The residential sector was identified as having 
many cost-effective abatement opportunities, 
though this has since been recognised as 
a greater challenge to achieve than some 
expected.
Subsequent energy efficiency programmes 
were consequently oriented to focus on carbon 
emission reductions in line with climate change 
mitigation goals, as well as energy efficiency. 
The supplier-led successor to EEC, the Carbon 
Emission Reduction Target (CERT) (2008-2012), 
raised the scale further, and was complemented 
by the Community Energy Saving Programme 
(CESP) (2009-2012) which focused more on 
communities and vulnerable households. 
Based on the modelled impact of measures 
implemented, these delivered an estimated 
lifetime savings of almost 300 MtCO2 – equivalent 
to around half the UK annual emissions or taking 
all passenger cars off the road for four years – 
and these programmes resulted in a number of 
improvements, including energy savings, greater 
thermal comfort, and wellbeing.
Whilst  it is difficult to  give the precise 
improvement, adding insulation into lofts 
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and cavity walls and replacing standard with 
condensing boilers will mean that housing 
need less heat energy to meet a desired indoor 
temperature. After more than three decades of 
almost stable household energy use, the decade 
since 2004 has seen energy consumption per 
household fall by about 20%, with gas and 
electricity following a similar trend, as detailed 
by DECC in Energy Consumption in the UK 
(2015). 
The reductions in gas and electricity consumption 
since 2008 (when CERT started) are comparable 
with the accredited savings arising from that 
programme (Table 1) 1. It seems reasonable to 
deduce that the energy efficiency programmes 
have played a large role in reducing national gas 
and electricity demand since then.  
Moreover, this would correspond to over £2bn 
annual savings on energy bills, which is more 
than twice the average implementation costs 
during the scheme’s lifetime – and of course, 
the savings last for much longer. Even allowing 
for some rebound and other factors indicated 
below, during its operation the savings from 
CERT in particular seem substantially larger than 
the programme costs, and of course extend for 
very much longer.  
A much fuller evaluation would be desirable 
but it seems likely that over the lifetime of 
the measures taken, CERT will have saved 
consumers many times more than it cost.
 
These obviously are considerable savings. 
Yet, many programmes have not achieved the 
saving levels as predicted by the modelling. It is 
not clear whether this apparent ‘delivery gap’ is 
because of consumer choices, poorly installed 
measures, or poorly calibrated models. Very 
likely it is a combination of all three. Evidence 
from a number of government-sponsored and 
independent evaluations have shown that 
these programmes have impacted on more 
than energy performance, including increasing 
indoor temperatures and improving wellbeing 
(Gilbertson et al., 2012; Hong et al., 2009). 
Many of these retrofits were delivered to 
vulnerable households, many of whom may 
have had unmet needs for heating and could be 
described as living in energy poverty. If this is 
the case, it is very likely that the models used 
to estimate the potential savings were not 
calibrated to estimate realistic energy (and CO2) 
savings – the DECC 2014 Prices and Bills report 
revised down its estimate of consumer savings 
from the programmes significantly in the light 
of these findings – but some of the benefits 
emerged in other ways (e.g. warmer homes).
During this same period, the building regulations 
that focused on energy performance were 
incrementally increased in order to reduce heat 
losses through the building fabric and glazing 
and sought improvements in heating system 
efficiency. The more stringent improvements were 
initially driven by a 2006 policy announcement 
that set a target of ‘zero carbon’ for all new 
dwellings built by 2016, which required 25% 
and 44% improvements in energy performance 
standards by 2010 and 2015 respectively, with 
Passivhaus standards (a voluntary standard 
for building a high performance building that 
requires very little (c. 15 kWh/m2/year) space 
heating or cooling) being approached by 2015.
The third thread of energy efficiency policy in 
the UK (along with the supplier-led programmes 
and building standards) over this period was 
implementation of improved appliance energy 
standards, which have largely been driven 
by EU legislation on minimum performance 
requirements. For example, in the mid 1990’s, 
any domestic white good refrigerated appliances 
sold were required to achieve an energy rating 
of A-C, which achieved a 15% improvement 
within 15 months of implementation and a drop 
in consumer prices (Schiellerup, 2002). 
The delivery of these product standards required 
the efforts of forward thinking legislators, leading 
product manufacturers, and consumers. In this 
instance, each entity acts in an interactive and 
inter-dependant manner that leads to a shift in 
the market place, with regulation being one of 
the most powerful tools available to enable the 
transformation (Boardman, 2004).
Recent developments and lessons 
During the last Parliament, these programmes in 
turn were succeeded by the Green Deal (2012-
2015), which aimed to empower consumer-led 
efficiency with financing package for costs to be 
recouped through long-term deductions from 
energy bills; and an Energy Company Obligation 
(ECO) (2012-present) to focus on deeper and 
more expensive retrofits like solid wall insulation. 
However, take-up of the Green Deal was 
dismal (only 15,000 had been installed or near 
completion when the Green Deal Finance 
Company was shuttered). It reflected a classic 
assumption that the barriers were primarily 
financial, rather than structural or behavioural, 
and its limitations and risk of failure were indeed 
predicted (Rosenow and Eyre, 2013). Delivery 
of ECO was also smaller than anticipated and 
the programme was substantially scaled back in 
2013. 
Whilst the EC-led standards on appliances 
continue, the new government has closed the 
Green Deal, announced fuller reviews of energy 
efficiency including ECO (and programmes for 
business energy efficiency), and abandoned the 
targets associated with ‘zero carbon homes’, 
with the main concern being cited as both the 
cost and challenge of achieving the target on-
site energy efficiency standards.  
Concerns were highlighted early on when the 
performance standard targets were initially 
set out (Lowe and Oreszczyn, 2008), and that 
government needed to focus on: improving 
skills, knowledge transfer and procurement 
1 Total gas consumption reduced by about 50TWh/annum from 2008-2014 and electricity consumption reduced by about 8.5TWh 
over the same period (both temperate corrected). The CERT credited emission savings imply energy demand reductions astonishingly 
similar to these numbers.  If 75% of deemed emission savings came from the impact of household measures on gas demand (see 
Ofgem (2013, Figure 2.2), then the lifetime saving is 1200TWh; assuming an average lifetime of 25 years (the actual lifetimes assumed 
varied significantly by measure) then the annual saving is 48TWh/yr.  The corresponding total for electricity-related measures would be 
140TWh, and if the average lifetime were 10 years the savings would be 14TWh/yr.  Over this period retail gas prices were typically over 
2p/kWh and electricity prices around 10p/kWh, which would make the overall value of energy saving over £2bn annually given these 
simplified assumptions).  The estimates are approximate and more detailed evaluation would be highly desirable but none was made 
available to the author; also note that the deemed savings were based on assumed savings per measure; as the text notes, actual in-
situ savings may be less.  The implementation costs of delivering these savings averaged substantially under £1bn / year (see Table 1). 
Table 1: Indicative estimate of CERT costs and savings
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mechanisms within the construction industry, 
achieving greater inter-government department 
cooperation, and more closely aligning carbon 
target with building regulations.  These needed 
to be supported through research and rapid 
evidence base development using more in-
depth and project planning-development and 
operation lifecycle research.
What have we learned from the above 
programmes and policies? First, we know that 
energy efficiency is not a simple economic 
process that responds easily to either 
straightforward price signals (like general energy 
prices) or even to measures addressed purely 
to financial barriers (like the initial form of the 
Green Deal).  
Delivering energy performance improvements 
into the housing market through millions of 
retrofits is itself a complex process involving 
numerous actors and stakeholders.  Yet, the 
evidence shows that these measures can be 
delivered and do have a real impact on energy 
performance, thermal comfort and wellbeing.
We know that many of these retrofits under 
the supplier-mandated programmes were the 
“low hanging fruit”, such as loft and cavity wall 
installation and boiler replacement, and that 
future retrofits will be more complex and require 
greater changes to the dwelling. 
However, this knowledge has only been achieved 
through a combination of directed and ad-hoc 
evaluations. If a greater understanding of both 
the direct and indirect impacts are to be known, 
future policies must explicitly include both 
implementation and final impact and process 
evaluations, whether they are government or 
industry led.  Evaluations are an essential part 
of understanding what works and what does 
not, they can help to avoid potentially millions of 
pounds spent on delivering ineffective efficiency 
retrofits or to improve ineffective delivery of 
sound efficiency retrofits.
We know that markets will respond to clear and 
challenging but achievable regulations when 
there is a large market available, such as the 
case white good appliances.  We also know that 
incentives can work, such as the highly over-
subscribed Green Deal Home Improvement 
Fund, which offered up to £4000 for solid wall 
insulation.  However, achieving long term energy 
efficiency market stability through rebates 
is problematic given dependence on direct 
pubic finance. We also know that delivering 
very challenging energy performance and CO2 
targets without the necessary regulation, skills 
and supply chains can lead to uncoordinated 
efforts that are easily disrupted. Energy efficiency 
markets need both incentives to transform but 
should be supported through regulation that can 
avoid markets from becoming reliant on subsidy.
Abandoning the zero carbon homes policy 
has sent shock-waves through an industry 
which has spent almost a decade building the 
capability to deliver.  The recently announced 
end of the Green Deal Finance Company means 
that the only energy efficiency policy remaining 
is the ECO, which will itself be subject to major 
changes. With the build regulation targets no 
longer being clearly defined, there is a gaping 
hole in domestic energy efficiency policy on a 
scale not seen for decades. 
For housing, we know that the primary concern, 
as stated in the HM Treasury report Fixing the 
foundation: creating a more prosperous nation, 
is to build ‘more homes that people can afford to 
buy’.  The implied assumption is that delivering 
low-energy and low-carbon housing risks 
placing an undue burden on developers and thus 
home buyers. However, we cannot leave energy 
performance improvement to millions of existing 
homes to market forces alone.  The evidence 
shows that most people when choosing to 
retrofit their home do so when they are planning 
otherwise considerable disruptions, e.g. selling 
or expanding their home, and that energy 
performance is not necessarily high among their 
motivations (Wilson et al., 2015).  
One radical option, consequently, would be to 
apply energy efficiency requirements at time of 
private house sales, which would not directly 
impinge on first-time buyers, but would help to 
sustain improvement in the UK’s building stock. 
Using the lending process as a means to incentive 
energy performance and add a price premium 
to efficient homes may be a part solution to 
motivating home owners to invest and mortgage 
lenders and help realise investment value. What 
is clearly needed is some mechanism that either 
requires or otherwise brings value to improving 
household energy performance during these 
change points through clear and cost-effective 
means.
What does UK residential energy policy need to 
look like going forward? We see energy policy 
needing to respond according to the different 
domains involved in the process of improving 
residential energy performance, this would 
mean: 
• programmes funded directly by 
government should be more highly 
focused in their targeting, such as 
highly vulnerable households that 
may not benefit from broader eligibility 
programmes. 
• policies acting through energy 
suppliers should be flexible enough 
to allow for some discretion for how 
savings are delivered but specific 
enough to ensure that actual results 
are achieved across a wide number of 
households.
An independent and accountable market of 
energy efficiency installers and investors who are 
able to compete in a well-balanced market must 
be allowed to develop.  This means installers 
must see sound technical installation and high-
performance as part of their value proposition 
and ultimately impacts their business activities. 
We must also ensure that households and 
funders see the value in investing in energy 
performance that pays through both operational 
savings but also through improved asset value 
over the medium to long term.  Evidence of 
accountability, transparency and efficacy are 
essential to ensuring energy efficiency activities 
are effective and valued.
Energy performance must realise its value to 
homeowners, which means putting in place 
mechanisms that clearly incentivise actions that 
prioritise more efficient dwellings.  This means 
sending messages out to where they are most 
likely to be well received.  For example, retiring 
households may be open to a small investment 
in energy efficiency to reduce the cost of running 
their home as their income reduces, while people 
who are about to purchasing a home might 
make an investment in energy efficiency in order 
to improve their longterm asset value.
The policy approach of the past should not be 
abandoned outright.  As suggested above, the 
government needs to understand why a policy 
was not successful to know whether it should 
be abandoned.  For example, the concept of 
‘pay as you save’, the underlying premise of the 
Green Deal, is not necessarily flawed and can be 
an effective method of incentivising action and 
realising value from energy efficiency.  However, 
there were clearly features of the Government’s 
enacted policy that limited its success, for 
example the high interest rates of the Green 
Deal compared to the low interest rates available 
from lenders.
In moving forward, we should expect the 
Government to look back on past energy 
efficiency policy experience in the housing 
market and to understand the opportunities 
and limitations of those policies in achieving 
their desired objectives.  The complexity of the 
housing market and the multiple actors that 
interact within this environment means that 
setting targets and reaching them is challenging. 
However, with a decent understanding of the 
past and present, we can continue to aim for a 
sustainable future.
Business energy efficiency 
It is more than thirty years since an Energy 
Efficiency Office was created inside the then 
Department of Trade and Industry. At one 
point, 20,000 businesses were involved with 
programme budgets of £70m pa in today’s 
money. “Win-win” and “triple bottom line” were 
the mantras of the day.  However the lesson, 
as with domestic energy efficiency, was that 
achieving the potential was more complex than 
it looked: only a quarter of apparently cost 
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effective measures were actually implemented. 
Expensive energy audit reports sat on company 
shelves. This fed an innate tendency for DTI 
to prioritise supply-side measures, and energy 
efficiency programme budgets were cut in half 
in the 1988/89 Spending Review.  
The fact is that for most companies (other than 
energy-intensive companies) energy costs are 
small as a proportion of turnover. Investment 
in efficiency, as a strategic priority, is down 
there with paperclips and bike racks: at best an 
indulgence and at worst a distraction. It is only 
when energy costs rise above 2% or so that 
the Board and Finance Director get interested. 
Consequently, corporate energy efficiency 
tends to be just as subject to ‘First Domain’ 
characteristics – behavioural and organizational 
features that lead to untapped but highly cost-
effective potential – as residential consumption. 
Governments however tend to be more 
skeptical of the idea that companies are also 
systematically wasting money on buying more 
energy than they need. 
It is also, arguably, none of government’s 
business – except when it is seeking the most 
cost-effective way of cutting emissions.  Shifting 
responsibility for energy efficiency from the DTI 
to the environment department in the 1990s 
thus stimulated a major rethink in how energy, 
industry and climate policy interacted. 
The outcome was a realisation that energy was 
not just about technologies, but about how they 
are used. A new discipline of energy management 
emerged in the UK and internationally, drawing 
on the wider corporate change management 
and quality benchmarking drive that began in 
the US in 1987.  The mid-1990s saw a revolution 
in the number and range of energy management 
schemes and standards: EMAS, EDAS, ISO 
14001 and so on.  Also, armed with computers 
and reams of monitoring data, researchers finally 
began to get a handle on how companies really 
made decisions about energy. This, in turn, 
finally began to unpick the energy efficiency 
“paradox”. 
The crucial insight was that energy efficiency was 
not an end in itself, but embedded in a far wider 
range of corporate priorities and organizational 
structures relevant to the companies’ strategic 
interests. This introduced policymakers to a 
whole new set of corporate levers: reputation, 
risk management, value, customer and investor 
satisfaction, competitor analysis and so on. 
This was the underpinning for the carbon 
management and industrial audit programmes 
that emerged in the early 2000s.
Policies and programmes became highly 
sophisticated, deploying a wide range of sticks 
and carrots designed to maximise the salience 
of energy efficiency in the markets they work 
with. Including other examples drawn from the 
across the EU:
• Interest-free technology loans 
coupled to supply chain networks and 
mentoring for small manufacturing 
SMEs.
• Capital allowances coupled to 
energy management standards and 
benchmarking advice for medium sized 
manufacturing companies.
• Large-scale energy audit and ESCO-
funded retrofit programmes for large, 
non-energy intensive manufacturing 
and process companies.
• Energy management standards 
for companies struggling with 
product differentiation (finance, legal, 
accounting).
• Recycling or interest-free loans 
coupled to technology procurement 
and accounting advice for large public 
sector organisations.
•  Energy performance data collection 
tools and mandatory reporting for 
commercial real estate developers and 
landlords.
• Information on investment patterns 
on energy efficiency measures for 
technology fund managers and capital 
finance institutions.
• Government and public sector 
procurement to drive market 
penetration of specific low carbon 
technologies, goods and services.
The experimental phase of the late 1990s/early 
2000s also delivered a UK emissions trading 
pilot, the Climate Change Levy and the Carbon 
Trust’s corporate energy efficiency programmes. 
The UK came to be seen as having the most 
innovative package of policies anywhere in the 
world.  
However most of the effort had been focused 
on manufacturing industry, and a mid-decade 
review identified an important gap, in the lack 
of an operationally effective incentive covering 
the service and public sectors (principally, 
buildings-related energy & emissions). The 
evidence gathered demonstrated that for these 
sectors, energy costs alone (even with the 
CCL) were largely written off at site level as an 
unavoidable cost of doing business. The CRC – 
originally, ‘carbon reduction commitment’ - was 
introduced to require full reporting of corporate 
emissions along with requirement to purchase 
corresponding emission allowances. 
This prompted Chief Finance Officers (or 
University, local government or other public 
sector authorities) to take an interest and 
provide the capital required to improve buildings 
efficiency, so as to reduce published energy & 
emissions and associated operating costs – the 
link between investment and operational costs 
which had hitherto been missing. 
For good or bad however, the last years of 
the Blair / Brown government had made the 
CRC far more complicated by linking recycling 
of the revenues raised to a league table of 
performance, which proved highly controversial 
and managerially onerous. In its first year of 
operation the CRC was credited with a sizeable 
reduction in emissions from the covered sectors 
(contributing to the improvement shown in 
Figure 2(b)); it remains unclear how much of this 
was due to the original proposition (combining 
economic and environmental incentives at 
corporate rather than site level), or the added 
motivations of the revenue recycling and league 
table. 
Recent developments and lessons 
The coalition government removed funding 
from the Carbon Trust (which after a difficult 
transition is growing again, both domestically 
and internationally, due to growing recognition 
of the value of its energy efficiency services). 
The ESOS audit scheme, as it stands, is a pale 
imitation of schemes operating in many other 
countries. The UK is one of the few western 
countries without a dedicated energy agency. 
Under the coalition, the Treasury removed the 
revenue recycling from the CRC – leaving the 
CRC as largely another tax albeit levied at 
corporate rather than site level – and league table 
requirements.  With the original intent largely 
lost in the maze of subsequent complications, 
revisions and retreats, it is likely that the CRC will 
be scrapped by the new government, though the 
reporting requirements are expected to remain 
in place so that companies still have to collect 
and publish data on their corporate energy and 
CO2 emissions. 
The trend of declining incentives for corporate 
energy efficiency already initiated under the 
coalition thus seems set to accelerate. It would 
however seem exaggeration to say we are 
going back to the naivety of the 1980s: there is 
simply too much demand-side momentum and 
infrastructure for it to be unpicked now. The 
Treasury consultation on business energy tax is 
quite open-ended.  It may be more of a blank 
sheet of paper rather than a hidden agenda.
The UK is sitting on a wealth of policy experience 
- perhaps more than any other country. The 
problem is that no-one in government has sat 
down and worked out what to do with it all. 
Without a clearer idea of intentions, it is hard to 
offer much advice beyond the need to learn from 
experience and avoid ideological simplifications 
of a complex issue. However some broad ground 
rules would include:
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• Policies must be integrated. It is 
no good having clever incentives 
and smart regulations if they aren’t 
managed together for maximum 
impact. It doesn’t have to be complex: 
make subsidy contingent on doing 
an audit, or adopting a standard for 
example.
• Policies also have to be flexible 
because energy efficiency means 
different things to different companies 
and sectors. The right policy will also 
change over time as capacity builds, 
so policies need to be responsive. This 
is complex, but it can be mapped.
• “Framing” is also important: how 
energy efficiency is “sold”. What is the 
right mix of drivers in the company 
or sector? Payback time, net present 
value or internal rate of return for the 
financial drivers; environment, climate, 
generic quality or wider corporate 
social responsibility for the non-
financial drivers?  
• Regulation simply cannot be ruled 
out. Indeed many companies and 
sectors demand it. Of course the usual 
caveats apply - it must be smart and 
proportionate. But there are many 
proven cases where the most cost 
effective policy is to make something 
mandatory.
• Local networks, particularly for SMEs, 
have great value by exploiting peer, 
utility and supply chain relationships 
and using local resources without 
government having to chip in too much. 
There remains, in short, significant scope to 
dovetail a wider business simplification-oriented 
agenda with continued incentives to help reduce 
the energy and environmental impact of UK 
corporations and public sector. 
By Paul Ekins
There is growing bewilderment practically 
everywhere about what the still relatively new UK 
Government is doing is respect of energy policy. 
The mantra since the election is that energy 
policy is to be re-set to achieve decarbonisation 
targets, to which the government says that it is 
still committed, in a more cost-effective way that 
will benefit the ‘hard-working families’ to which 
the government says that it is also committed.
Unfortunately it is quite impossible to recognise 
this laudable objective in the policies that have 
so far been implemented, especially those which 
use those policies called economic instruments 
– basically taxes, charges and subsidies – which 
are the subject of this blog.
Firstly, relatively low subsidies for the cheapest 
low-carbon energy source, onshore wind, are 
to be removed early, and planning permission 
has been made more difficult to secure even for 
those plants that do not need subsidy. 
Secondly, subsidies for the second cheapest 
low-carbon energy source, solar PV, seem likely 
to be drastically cut, just when industry sources 
thought that they were only a few years from 
being able to be subsidy-free, but depended 
on continuing support to get there. Over 1,000 
jobs in the solar industry have already gone, 
with more losses predicted if the subsidy cuts 
are followed through. These once hard-working 
families at least will find it difficult to discern the 
government’s concern for their welfare.
Of course, it is right that mature industries should 
be subsidy-free, and one might applaud the 
government for its aspirations, if not its timing, 
on this point, were it not for the fact that it is 
storming ahead with giving a very large subsidy to 
Hinkley Point C nuclear power station, including 
a price guarantee that will cost consumers an 
extra £4.4 bn to £20 bn, on the government’s 
own figures, with various credit guarantees, 
insurances and derisking subsidies on top. Yet 
nuclear power is a mature industry if ever there 
was one, and one whose costs, unlike those of 
renewables, resolutely refuse to fall and in this 
case will impact hard-working families and other 
energy consumers for 35 years from the date of 
first generation. It now looks almost certain that 
when power from Hinkley Point C finally comes 
on line, it will be substantially more expensive, 
and therefore more heavily subsidised, even 
than offshore wind, which was once thought 
to be unassailable as the most expensive low-
carbon energy source.
In short, the government’s subsidy policy is 
anything but cost-effective, and will maintain a 
burden on hard-working families for decades and 
everyone else, whilst eschewing energy sources 
that would seem only to need a few more years’ 
support. The credibility of the government’s 
repeated stated commitments to both cost-
effectiveness and emissions reduction is fatally 
undermined by its removal of the specific tax 
incentives for energy efficiency and renewables, 
which score at the top of the range on both 
counts.
So to the tax side of economic instruments, 
concerning which there have been two major 
changes from the new government in its Summer 
Budget 2015. First, the exemption from the 
Climate Change Levy (the tax on the business 
use of energy) which was accorded to renewable 
electricity sources has been removed. This was 
announced in July and took effect from August 
1st, without any prior consultation, thereby 
depriving renewable generators of a source 
of revenue (currently £5.54/MWh) which they 
will certainly have factored into their business 
plans when these were created – and bidding 
competitively for government contracts. 
While perhaps not technically retrospective 
legislation, such a change is devastating 
for business confidence in the stability and 
predictability of government policy, something 
which this government, as others before it, 
claims to be committed to. For example, a recent 
government consultation paper relevant to this 
blog, ‘Reforming the business energy efficiency 
tax landscape’, states: “The government is 
committed to developing an effective framework 
that provides businesses with certainty and 
encourages business investment in energy 
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efficiency and carbon saving” – an assurance 
that might be expected to attract the cynical 
riposte from renewable generators at least: 
“At least until the next Budget” – this change 
is expected to increase government revenues 
(if current investment plans still proceed with 
the corresponding added cost) by about £900 
million by 2020.
The other energy-related tax adjustment in the 
Summer Budget was the abolition, apart from in 
the year of purchase, of the gradation of Vehicle 
Excise Duty according to the vehicle’s calculated 
carbon dioxide emissions per km travelled. 
Before the Summer Budget this ranged from £0 
(for 0-100 gCO2/km) to £505 (for over 255 gCO2/
km) per year. The Summer Budget changed 
this such that all new registrations from April 17 
will pay a flat rate of £140 per year (with a £310 
supplement for cars with a list price of more 
than £40,000), including vehicles with emissions 
of 1-50 gCO2/km per year. The new first-year 
rates range from £0-2,000, compared to £0-
1,100 under the current system. The change is 
expected to increase the tax take by about £1 
billion per year by 2020, with the main losers the 
drivers of low-emission vehicles.
In sum, this is a very strange way for a government 
to proceed when it claims to be interested in 
business investment in energy efficiency and 
carbon saving, both of which require some 
confidence in the stability of government policy 
which this government’s actions over the last 
six months have done much to destroy. What 
does this say about the likely outcome of the 
consultation on the ‘business energy efficiency 
tax landscape’?
One tax from the last government that has so 
far survived the energy policy activism of this 
one is the carbon price support (CPS). This was 
originally intended to rise at a rate reflecting the 
Treasury’s estimated ‘social cost of carbon’, but 
in the face of political concern about energy 
bills this ‘escalator’ was halted in the 2015 
budget, with the CPS at around £18/tCO2 until 
2020, . Apart from earning the Treasury around 
£2 billion a year, this tax plays a crucial role in 
reducing emissions from UK coal-fired power 
stations, with the removal of the CCL exemption 
for renewables the government seems to be 
drawing a distinction between taxes for climate 
policy, such as the CSP, and taxes for energy 
efficiency, such as the CCL and the other 
instruments mentioned in the consultation paper.
As far as these instruments are concerned, some 
simplification of the tax landscape can surely 
be expected. The main question is whether this 
will level up or down the effective rate of energy 
taxation. 
Even though these taxes will be denominated in 
energy, it would be desirable for their rates to 
be based on the energy’s carbon content. The 
government’s carbon price trajectory for firms 
outside the EU ETS suggests that this price 
should now be around £60/tCO2, increasing 
to £76/tCO2 by 2030. For electricity, the CPF, 
CCL and CRC (Carbon Reduction Commitment) 
together add up to about £55/tCO2. For gas, the 
CCL and CRC add up to much less, only around 
£22/tCO2. Taxing both these energy types at 
£60/tCO2 (about £14/MWh for electricity and 
£11/MWh for gas) would therefore both simplify 
the tax rates and tie them explicitly into climate 
policy. 
The Climate Change Agreement rebates 
on the taxes for so-called energy-intensive 
sectors would probably need to be maintained 
for political reasons. Such an outcome to 
the consultation would do little to rectify the 
inconsistencies on the subsidy side of energy 
and climate highlighted above, but it would at 
least show that with tax policy the government 
was more committed to tax efficiency than its 
predecessor, without being less committed to 
emissions reduction, as it states.
By Will McDowall and Andrew ZP Smith
Innovation is one of those uncontroversially 
good things that politicians love to champion. 
For those worried about the economy, innovation 
is agreed to be a fundamental driver of long-
term economic growth. For everyone worried 
about the environment, innovation is crucial 
for decoupling that growth from environmental 
damages, and achieving the deep reductions in 
emissions that are necessary.
So far, so much agreement. But academics, 
policy analysts and commentators have often 
disagreed about the detail of how best to drive 
innovation, particularly in clean technologies. 
There are some economists who argue that, 
beyond some support for basic R&D, government 
should be involved as little as possible. They 
argue that innovation is too uncertain for 
governments to engage in: it’s private actors 
that should take on the risks and rewards of 
developing the technologies and systems of 
tomorrow. After all, who other than businesses 
can really know what consumers will demand?
It’s presumably a belief that government should 
‘get out of the way’ and let competitive forces 
to do the job that led Amber Rudd to declare 
recently that energy sector privatisations 
and deregulations of the 1990s “encouraged 
innovation” (Rudd, 2015). Unfortunately it seems 
Amber Rudd was repeating a highly misleading 
classical mantra. Certainly, privatisation injected 
innovation in business models and spurred 
investment in gas plants. But on practically 
any other measure, energy innovation fell 
dramatically following privatisation. Patents, 
research publications, R&D spending: all 
collapsed, as the previously nationalised energy 
companies closed down their research labs and 
focused on nearer term profits. Leaving energy 
innovation to the competitive market was a 
comprehensive failure of those 1990s reforms.
Our own research (Ekins et al. 2014; Grubb et al. 
2014), and that of many others, makes clear that 
for innovation in general—and energy innovation 
in particular—a role for government is essential, 
since the pay-offs of investment in innovation 
are hard to monopolise, and they are often on 
a longer time scale than investors are willing to 
accept. In the energy sector, private investment 
into R&D tends to be particularly weak (Grubb 
et al. 2014): measured as a proportion of total 
turnover, energy sector R&D spending is around 
a 20th of that seen in highly innovative sectors 
like IT and Pharmaceuticals. 
Competitive markets will deliver energy 
innovation along established, business-as-usual 
trajectories, as with fossil fuel extraction (deep 
water oil drilling or oil sands refining come to 
mind), though even here government support 
has often been crucial. But strategic investment 
and direction is critical to enable the innovation 
that is required for decarbonising the economy, 
and to do so in a way that delivers the best 
economic outcomes for the UK.
All of this is particularly important for offshore 
wind.
The UK has pioneered the offshore wind 
industry we see today, driving into deeper 
waters, further offshore, and to larger scale than 
any other country. Coming from a weak starting 
point, the UK has established a large and 
growing domestic supply chain, bringing more 
and more of the economic benefits of offshore 
development into the UK economy. But offshore 
wind is still far from mature. While early turbines 
were essentially onshore models planted in the 
inter-tidal area, the industry today is seeing 
huge innovation across the supply chain, from 
the heavy equipment of installation vessels and 
turbine foundations to the high tech design of 
software control systems.
It is no exaggeration to say that the UK’s 
investments in offshore wind have revolutionised 
the prospects for offshore wind globally. The 
UK accounts for only 2% of global emissions, 
and in that sense our emissions reductions 
are a marginal part of the global story. But 
contributions to real technology progress, as we 
have achieved in offshore wind, are potentially 
just as significant.
The longer term prize remains huge: the North 
is  amber Rudd’s energy policy ‘reset’ innovation-friendly?
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Sea represents a globally unparalleled resource 
both for deployment and for innovation. Within 
UK waters, the most recent estimates (Cavazzi 
& Dutton 2016) find that an astonishing 650GW 
of offshore wind capacity (many times UK peak 
electricity demand) is in principle available at 
a cost of power below £120/MWh, even when 
taking account of the various exclusion zones 
and shipping lanes. That’s just the UK’s resource, 
and it represents more than total European peak 
demand (ENTSO-E 2014). 
The wider North Sea represents a still larger 
opportunity not only for offshore wind deployment, 
but also for offshore wind innovation and cost 
reduction. The relatively benign conditions of the 
North Sea enable experimentation and learning 
at a lower cost, providing the UK and our North 
Sea partners with opportunities to lead the 
developments of offshore wind technologies for 
other markets. 
As Rudd and her team develop the policy reset, 
we suggest three key lessons to ensure that 
innovation in offshore wind continues to be 
promoted, and not stalled:
• Focusing on cost reduction above all 
else can backfire. In the 1990s, the UK 
support mechanisms for onshore wind 
were highly competitive, and designed 
to yield the very cheapest and most 
cost-effective projects. This provided 
strong incentives for wind companies to 
innovate to cut costs: but the industry 
and technology were simply not mature 
enough. The pressure on costs stifled 
the “nursing” and “bridging” markets 
that are essential for the establishment 
of a new industry that is characterised 
by significant public goods. As we 
have argued above, offshore wind is 
maturing rapidly, but it is not yet out of 
that critical bridging phase. Certainly, it 
is vital to ensure that pressure to reduce 
costs is built into support mechanisms: 
through competition and through a 
clear process for support degression. 
But prioritising cost reductions above 
all else will hamper investment and 
industrial development.
• Maintaining confidence in the 
direction of travel is critical to success 
and to cost reduction. Investors and 
project developers are increasingly 
concerned that the priorities are shifting 
away from offshore wind, despite 
Rudd’s protestations to the contrary. 
Certainly, the government’s assault 
on existing renewable energy support 
measures (for biomass, solar and 
onshore wind), and talk of an ill-defined 
‘reset’, have rattled the sense that 
the UK is committed to developing a 
renewable energy system. Yet it is clear 
that confidence drives investment and 
supply-chain development. For the UK, 
this is particularly important: confident 
long-term signals will mean that the 
UK role in the European offshore wind 
industry will continue to grow, bringing 
economic benefits alongside carbon 
reductions.
• Both deployment and R&D support 
matter. At a time when public finances 
are under pressure, some have 
argued (e.g. Helm 2015) that it would 
be a better use of money to direct it 
towards more basic energy research. 
There is certainly a case for more 
energy R&D funding. The UK spends 
relatively little on energy R&D, both in 
terms of international comparisons and 
with respect to our level of ambition 
for decarbonisation. But innovation 
requires learning-by-doing as well 
as research: they are complements, 
not substitutes. While we can argue 
about the precise balance of the two, 
it is clear that if the reset results in 
an investment hiatus, the damage to 
supply chains and real world learning 
will not be offset by technological silver 
bullets emerging from the lab. 
And as has recently been pointed out (Gross, 
2015), R&D results take time to mature, which 
means that when we are looking to deliver 
solutions in ten years’ time, these won’t come 
from diverting funding from deployment into 
basic research on blue-sky technologies today, 
but in evolving and refining technologies that 
have already passed proof-of-concept.
It’s worth remembering why the UK got into 
offshore wind in the first place. Meeting energy 
policy goals and decarbonising electricity 
requires success in at least two of four big 
challenges: only nuclear power, offshore wind, 
CCS and energy efficiency each have the 
potential to contribute several tens of gigawatts 
of zero carbon energy supplies in Britain. All have 
their drawbacks, but of the generation options it 
is offshore wind that has proved the easiest to 
deploy at scale in the near term.
It is also worth recalling that when the UK 
took its first tentative steps into North Sea oil 
in the late 1960s, much of it looked hopelessly 
uneconomic. The combination of government 
support and the oil price shocks of the 1970s 
promoted an industry that was projected to 
produce oil at a cost well over $50 per barrel. It 
took more than a decade of capital investment 
exceeding £5bn/yr in todays prices, before it 
proved able to produce at a small fraction of that 
cost, with huge benefits to the UK economy.  
As the direct result of strategic investments in 
offshore wind, Britain has a burgeoning offshore 
wind supply chain that has to date been willing 
to invest in novel processes and technologies, 
driving the innovation that the government is so 
keen to promote. Having made such progress, a 
badly handled reset could result in precisely the 
outcome that Rudd fears: expensive investments 
in offshore wind with neither the cost reductions 
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By Michael Grubb
The UK’s Energy Market Reform was introduced 
for two main reasons: concern that inadequate 
private investment under the liberalized system 
was eroding the UK’s security of supply, and 
growing recognition that the existing system 
of Renewables Obligation Certificates (ROC) 
support was an inefficient way to support 
capital-intensive, low carbon investments like 
renewable energy. 
The EMR was intended to address these 
concerns. Contracts-for-Difference (CfDs), 
providing a long term fixed-price contract, were 
introduced to enhance investor confidence and 
thus reduce financing costs; CfDs were seen not 
only as a preferable way to support renewable 
energy, but also one applicable to nuclear 
energy. The Capacity Mechanism introduced 
fixed payments to all plants guaranteeing power 
available when needed.
Following a first set of negotiated CfD contracts, 
the coalition proceeded to use competitive 
auctions, in December 2014 (for capacity 
contracts) and January 2015 (for CfD contracts). 
By most standards, this auction experience 
proved successful: the targeted volume under 
the Capacity Mechanism was procured for total 
system payment under £1bn (annual payment 
starting in 2018), much less than predicted, 
and prices under the CfD auctions proved 
substantially lower than the negotiated contracts 
prices the previous year.
Indeed, the Cambridge economist David 
Newbery (2015) estimated that the value of 
long-term confidence associated with the CfD 
contracts reduced the average weighted cost of 
capital by 3.3 percentage points compared to 
the previous ROCs system. If total low carbon 
investment over the next decade amounts to 
£60bn for example, this would imply a saving of 
around £2bn compared to the previous policy 
frameworks.
Challenges 
Despite the apparent effectiveness of the EMR 
package, the incoming government faced 
several challenges. The first was an obvious 
tension between its two main headline energy 
manifesto commitments, namely “to deliver 
clean energy as cheaply as possible”, and to 
“remove subsidies” from onshore wind energy, 
the cheapest large-scale renewable source. 
But the issue which grabbed the headlines 
within weeks of the government taking office, 
was that the renewable energy supports were 
breaching the Levy Control Framework, agreed 
with the Treasury to cap supports at £7.6bn/yr 
by 2020; projections for 2020 suggested that 
commitments already made or advanced in the 
pipeline would take the cost over £9bn (Figure 
1).
 
Paradoxically, this partly reflected success due 
to the volume of renewable energy far exceeding 
expectations. Installed solar energy capacity by 
2015 had grown to five times the level projected, 
at half the cost per unit. Wind turbines have also 
been producing more power than expected, 
in particular with higher load factors offshore. 
Both increase the volume of renewable energy 
receiving subsidies. 
At the same time, the Treasury’s earlier decision 
to freeze the carbon floor price, the subsidies 
to conventional power through the capacity 
mechanism, and the falling gas price have 
all combined to increase the bridge that CfD 
payments will have to span, to pay the contracted 
prices. To an important degree the cost overrun 
is a symptom of renewables success, but a 
classic failure of policy to plan for this. 2
These two factors primed the stage for a major 
reset. In addition to the measures on energy 
efficiency and fiscal measures described in 
earlier chapters, the government confirmed the 
removal of subsidies to onshore wind, shelved 
the CfD auctions due for later in 2015, and 
announced drastic cuts to feed-in-tariffs. The 
‘reset’ had been launched with determination.
Policy needs to move forward, not backward. As 
Gross (2015) emphasises, investor confidence 
is partly about contracts, but also and crucially 
about the wider stability of policy direction. 
Ripping up the EMR is neither credible (the 
problems that led to it would merely be 
exacerbated), nor necessary (the sizeable cost 
savings from moving to long term contracts, 
already demonstrated, clearly support the 
manifesto commitment to deliver renewables as 
cheaply as possible). 
Academics have long argued that gas will have an 
important role in low carbon electricity systems, 
in part to balance variable sources. Security 
is paramount and Amber Rudd’s reset speech 
underlined this. The Capacity Mechanism 
response so far has revealed that backup may 
be much cheaper than most people thought. Yet 
to the extent that Capacity Mechanism subsidies 
depress the wholesale electricity price, they 
increase the cost of CfDs. 
With the new government keen to bring new gas 
onstream, careful thought should be given to 
how best to do so, without falling into this trap. 
In fact, as Figure 3 illustrates, the Levy budget 
overrun is mostly due to the policy support 
systems in place before the EMR came in. The 
reset is, however, an opportunity for further 
reform. The rest of this chapter indicates some 
options. 
What’s in a subsidy? A framework for fully 
mature renewables
The commitment to ‘remove subsidies’ for 
onshore wind, and progressively reduce those 
for others, begs an apparently simple question: 
what is a subsidy? That sounds like a simple 
question, but it is in fact fundamental. The key 
to continue expanding renewables whilst cutting 
subsidies is to understand that it about risk 
allocation and full-cost accounting.
In Brazil for example, in recent years wind has 
beaten fossil fuel generation in open competition, 
Reform for Renewables in the eMR (energy Market Reform)
Figure 3. Support costs for renewable energy to 2020
2 It reflected a classic tendency to underestimate economics of scale and innovation in improving performance – a common inability to 
recognise the central importance of ‘Third Domain’ economic processes in the energy transition (Grubb, Hourcade and Neuhoff 2014, 
2015). The flaw in the EMR was not failure to anticipate the future, but to not be robust to its uncertainties: most notably, to fix feed-in 
tariffs and the Levy Control Framework without the flexibility required to cope with unexpected success. The fixed FiTs with periodic 
revision were intrinsically vulnerable to this kind of miscalculation; moreover, with periodic revisions leading to unpredictable degrees of 
tariff reductions, they also tended to lead to a rush of investments before the deadlines.
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with no subsidy. Of course, land is cheaper and 
so are planning and permitting costs, but the real 
key lies elsewhere: how the system allocates the 
economic risks. Fossil fuel plants are relatively 
cheap to build, but expensive to run. Renewables 
are the opposite way round. Brazil auctions 20 
year fixed-price contracts for electricity, which 
means that windfarms know exactly how much 
money they can generate, making them low risk 
and hence cheap to finance. Fossil fuel plants 
face the opposite risk, since they don’t know 
how much they may be needed or what their 
(fossil-fuel-driven) input costs will be.
UK and European electricity wholesale markets 
place price risks precisely the other way round. 
Fossil fuel generators largely set the price 
of electricity, including any carbon pricing. If 
renewables sell into this market they face the 
irony that our wholesale market places the risks 
of fossil fuel (and carbon) price uncertainty on 
renewable energy generators, not on the fossil 
fuel plants. Hence the large savings in financing 
costs identified in Newbery’s analysis of the CfD 
auctions. Similarly if CO2 is not properly priced, 
it is renewables that suffer.
The other big problem in defining subsidy 
concerns the extent to which environment and 
other ‘external’ costs are factored in to energy 
prices. A recent report of the IMF (2015) grabbed 
headlines by estimating that fossil fuels enjoy a 
whopping $5trn global subsidy. Others cried foul: 
the IMF was counting in ‘subsidy’ the unpaid 
cost of environmental damage they estimated 
from fossil fuel emissions, which dwarfed the 
direct financial subsidies. The UK already has its 
own way to estimate the damages associated 
with CO2 emissions: the Treasury’s ‘social cost 
of carbon’, which is used in government cost-
benefit calculations and rises to over £70/tCO2 
by 2030.
The Brazilian model itself is not a realistic option 
for the UK energy market. If the new government 
wants to take onshore wind out of procured 
CfD auctions, it needs to find a way to separate 
subsidy from the legitimate value of long-term 
contracts and carbon reduction – unless it really 
intends to tilt the playing field directly against 
its expressed desire to deliver renewables as 
cheaply as possible.
So here is a modest proposal to consider, 
closely aligned to proposals for ‘carbon 
contracts’ by Helm (2004) and by Newbery 
(Grubb and Newbery 2006) a decade ago. A 
‘subsidy-free CfD’ could be developed for new, 
unsubsidised onshore wind. The government 
would compensate the wind generators for any 
difference between the government ‘social cost 
of carbon’ (already established as its estimate 
of the cost of carbon damage) and the amount 
that fossil fuel generators actually pay for CO2 
emissions. This would not be subsidising wind, 
but merely ensuring that wind generators gained 
the value already officially accorded to reducing 
CO2 emissions: at the Treasury social cost of 
carbon for 2030, the value of the CO2 displaced 
by renewable energy could be on the order of 
£30/MWh. 3
Given the anaemic state of the European 
carbon pricing system and the freezing of the 
UK carbon price floor, no investor currently can 
rely on this value purely from wholesale market 
prices. Drawing on the demonstrated financial 
efficiency of contractual certainty, underwriting 
the carbon value in a long-term contract – a 
contract for difference on the carbon price, 
not the electricity price – would be the natural 
evolution to create a ‘subsidy free’ CfD. 
Moreover, this speaks to the government’s 
emphasis on consumers, who could then 
choose to buy green in ways that really mean 
something. Wind energy investors will get the 
environmental value of saving emissions, as they 
should. And none of these will be subsidised. If 
and when the carbon price is sufficient to ensure 
that fossil fuel generators pay this cost, there 
would be no underwriting cost, just the carbon 
price revenues to government.
Containing costs and reflecting value
Whatever steps are taken regarding onshore 
wind, continued support for other renewables 
will be necessary to continue their industrial 
development and cost reductions and to help 
deliver the UK’s renewable energy and carbon 
targets. As the scale rises, containing the 
costs becomes ever more crucial. Reflecting 
the explosive growth and cost reductions, 
the government review of solar feed-in-tariffs 
proposes big reductions, along with further 
automatic degression of tariffs as the installed 
capacity rises, the solution adopted in Germany 
If FiTs are maintained, history may well judge 
the changes to solar supports in particular as 
rationalisation, not politicisation – particularly if 
this is combined with a negotiated extension of 
the LCF to avoid the cliff-edge that renewables 
may otherwise face. For larger scale renewables, 
auctioning CfDs address directly the challenge 
of cost reduction through competitive pressures.
The fact that the UK’s biggest resources are 
solar and wind (both onshore, and offshore 
as considered in the previous chapter) points 
to a crucial factor which is glaring by its 
absence from incentives in the EMR – namely 
concerning the variability of most renewables. 
They are available as the weather dictates, not 
when power is most needed. With renewable 
contributions at 20-30% of supply these costs 
are modest (Skea et al 2006), but as capacity 
rises higher, the economic impact of variability 
will become rapidly more important. 
In part, this underlines the potential value 
of biomass-based electricity, ranging from 
various waste-to-energy plants to the biomass 
conversion of coal units in light of the coal phase-
out. The removal of renewables exemption from 
the Climate Change Levy dealt this a heavy blow, 
and concerns about the overall environmental 
footprint of various biomass chains underline 
the need for full life-cycle assessment. But there 
is no inherent reason why importing biomass is 
any more problematic than importing fossil fuels. 
Continuing CfDs could support improvements 
throughout the supply chain, with their value as 
firm capacity also factored in. 
DECC has launched a study of the wider costs 
of the variability of other renewables, and the 
policy challenge will be how to reflect these 
costs efficiently in incentives.4 One proposal – to 
force renewables into the capacity mechanism 
– would be a cure far worse than the problem. 
But the challenge remains that the fixed price 
contracts of CfDs, whilst useful for enhancing 
investor confidence, fails to send any signals 
for more efficient choices of source and sites, 
or for the most efficient integration of renewable 
energy into the UK power system.
Both seasonal and shorter term patterns are 
relevant. Solar output in summer is several times 
that in the winter, and in the next few summers 
we will start to see the impact on the system 
when high solar output combines with low 
summer demand. Storage can help to alleviate 
this (though at a cost) but it cannot solve the 
seasonal disparity: average electricity demand 
is twice as high in the winter, a profile which 
wind energy matches well. Of course, wind 
energy is also variable, and there is value in more 
diverse deployment of windfarms to reduce the 
aggregate variations.
The CfD system of fixed payments does not 
incentive this; nor does it reflect the costs of 
fluctuations on the system imposed by wind 
and solar, which have to be managed. Moreover, 
by giving a fixed payment to all output, it risks 
3 As well as the carbon price, the value depends upon the carbon intensity of the fuel displaced by renewable generation. If this is 
taken as an advanced gas plant at 400 gCO2/kWh, this equates to £28/MWh. If there is any coal still on the system, the value would 
be substantially higher. Even if the EU ETS were to remain anaemic and the UK carbon floor price remained close to its present level, 
the cost differential underwritten by government in such contracts would be about £20/MWh. For comparison the clearing price for 
wind in the last CfD auction was around £80/MWh.
4 Helm’s (2015) suggestion that renewables support should be transferred to the capacity mechanism would be fantastically inefficient, 
since it would require individual renewable projects to have their own backup rather than pool backup capacity for the system overall – 
losing both the benefits of source diversity and leading to huge redundancy in ‘backup’ investments. It would be logically analogous to 
expecting the UK system to have enough capacity to insure against the possibility of every kettle and other appliance being on at the 
same time – at vast expense for redundant ‘backup’ capacity that is never needed.
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over-paying the best sites, and projects which 
substantially out-perform expectations (as with 
the recent offshore wind experience).
To address the last of these problems, Newbery 
(2015) suggests payments based on installed 
capacity (rather than actual output) or capped 
at a certain level of output.5  A related idea might 
help also to start reflecting some other aspects 
of variable output. The wholesale electricity price 
reflects the cost of conventional generation at a 
given time. As the capacity of renewables rises 
(and as capacity margins tighten), variations in 
renewable energy output will increasingly also 
impact the wholesale price, and prices in the 
balancing mechanism which matches supply 
and demand over short periods. 
CfD contracts could hence be paid on a basis 
of “deemed output” – notionally, an average 
expected output – with payments then being 
adjusted according to the actual wholesale 
value of the power generated at a given time. 
This would preserve much of the investment 
efficiency properties of the existing CfD 
contracts, but adjust it with reference to the 
actual dynamic value of the renewable output in 
the system operation.
Conclusions
The first of the ‘four simple steps to maintain 
investor confidence ..’ suggested by Gross 
(2015) is to ‘provide longer term clarity and 
continuity’. This is a difficult balancing act, since 
policy also needs to learn from experience and 
evolve. Some of the suggestions in this chapter 
could take a long time to work through in 
detail. The government has already aborted the 
Renewable Obligations for onshore wind from 
2016 and ensured that any remaining FiTs would 
have automatic degression. 
The upside of the LCF overshoot however is that 
the volume of renewables being contracted is 
already close to the initially targeted contribution 
of electricity to the overall renewables 2020 
target. This contrasts sharply with the heat and 
transport sectors, where progress has proved 
more difficult.
Amber Rudd’s recent reminder that the 
renewables target is legally binding, precisely 
to enhance investor confidence, could aid 
rationalisation. The target could include a higher 
share of renewable electricity if deployment 
continues. There is a strong case for pressing 
ahead with the next round of both Capacity 
auctions, to ensure security, and another round 
of CfD auctions, to help maintain industrial 
momentum and deliver the 2020 renewables 
target, and to buy time for deeper reforms 
needed for the post 2020 era.
This chapter has indicated that there are solutions 
to the longer term challenges. In addressing 
these problems creatively and reasserting the 
renewables target, the government has the 
opportunity to make important improvements 
to the EMR whilst preserving its essential 
features: to go forwards, with a more efficient 
supporting framework for renewables, rather 
than backwards. 
This report has brought together contributions 
from several leading researchers at UCL, to 
comment on the changes wrought in the first 
100 days of the conservative government.  In 
general the impression left is one of a spasm 
of activities which mixed rationalisation and the 
politicisation of energy and climate policy, driven 
more by a sense of what the government did not 
want (including the budget overrun), rather than 
a considered view on what it does believe forms 
rational policy. 
Perhaps the most striking feature is the near-void 
that now surrounds energy efficiency. The abrupt 
termination of the zero carbon homes policy, and 
the changes to the Vehicle Excise Duty, appear 
to have been driven significantly by Treasury 
antipathy to carbon-related policies that do not 
accord with neoclassical market assumptions or 
the wider deregulatory agenda. The Budget of 
25th November, just as this report went to press, 
does not suggest this has significantly changed. 6
After a decade of declining energy demand, this 
approach appears to risk exposing UK consumers 
to higher energy costs than needed, and increase 
the costs of decarbonisation. Quite how policy 
will develop as the government confronts this 
evidence remains to be seen. With Amber Rudd’s 
reset speech cementing the broad aims, tension 
between the instincts of the Treasury and the 
evidence-base of DECC may only heighten.  If 
the government is serious about energy (and 
cost) efficiency, our contributors have put forward 
plentiful options. 
Naturally our report could not be comprehensive. 
Beyond energy efficiency, we have focused mainly 
on the electricity sector, where the issues are well 
developed. If the ‘reset speech’ has helped to 
stabilise expectations, the major test will lie in 
whether the government creates a structure for 
capital investment with declining subsidies, in 
ways that maintain the pace of cost reductions 
without wholly disrupting the still fast-evolving 
solar and offshore wind industries.  
More generally: whether the government moves 
to a level playing field onshore with appropriate 
market and planning regimes for onshore wind 
and shale gas; whether and how it encourages 
decentralised and community energy schemes; 
whether it pursues a framework for economically-
driven choices between nuclear and offshore 
wind; and how, more broadly, it supports the 
transformation of the electricity system to adapt, 
as it can, to the efficient integration of variable 
power sources and storage. 
Beyond energy efficiency and the electricity 
sector, there is clearly much to be done. Transport 
policy is a field in its own right, though the 
apparent pace of vehicle and battery technology 
creates the potential for transport to be slowly 
integrated with the electricity system. Heat 
appears much harder, and at present threatens to 
become the Achilles Heel of the UK’s long term 
decarbonisation strategy. Innovation remains 
crucial across all fronts, and needs to be better 
embedded in an overall strategy of transformation 
that combined efficiency, markets, and innovation 
with associated structural changes.
In recent years, the markets agenda has suffered 
with the malaise of the EU ETS and the political 
strain of globally unprecedented energy prices. As 
the International Energy Agency has long noted, 
falling international fossil fuel prices are partly a 
consequence of progress towards a low carbon 
economy. They also in turn create a better context 
for the drive to use market-based instruments, in 
particular carbon pricing, across the economy. 
In this sense, the government does indeed have 
an opportunity to rebalance the effort towards 
market-based instruments. To realise its ambitions 
in this area however, the government will need 
to ensure that Treasury drives for tax efficiency 
also address carbon efficiency; and that it truly 
embodies an integrated strategy across all three 
pillars of a coherent and evidence-based energy 
policy. If the government is serious about the 
‘hard reset’ being a rationalisation of UK energy 
policy consistent with the strategic goals mapped 
out, there is valuable scope to do so.
5 Newbery (2015) offers a number of other suggestions for improving the CfD structure, including that contracts should be 
denominated in nominal rather than indexed-linked payments; this could also be important to facilitate the tradability of long term 
renewable energy contracts.
6 The Chancellor’s speech of 25th November 2015 states: “we will reform the Renewable Heat Incentive to save £700 million. I can announce we’re 
introducing a cheaper domestic energy efficiency scheme that replaces ECO. Britain’s new energy scheme will save an average of £30 a year from the 
energy bills of 24 million households.”  It is obviously easy to state reductions in costs; the issue is what benefits one loses along with that.  As illustrated in 
Chapter 2’s analysis of CERT, spending a billion pounds annually on energy efficiency has delivered twice that in the value of reduced energy consumption 
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